Proof of control of a self-hosted wallet

Prove who controls an address.

Send a counterparty a link. They sign a challenge with any wallet, a hardware device, or a pasted signature. You get a verifiable certificate that the key was controlled — anchored on-chain. No screenshots, no Satoshi test.

Create a verification requestSee what it proves

Built for FATF R16 / EU TFR / MiCA. The signer never needs an account.

See it in 71 seconds

How it works

Three steps. The counterparty does one of them, and needs no account to do it.

STEP 01

Create & send a link

Pick a chain, add your reference, get a link (or QR) to send however you like.

STEP 02

They sign the message

The counterparty signs plain text with any wallet. Never a transaction, never a seed phrase.

STEP 03

You get a certificate

Verified on the right chain, certified, and anchored on-chain to fix the time it existed.

How the proof is built

The signature is verified, hashed into a certificate, folded into a merkle root, and anchored — first on Polygon, then Bitcoin.

The claim
Challenge
nonce 8f3c…
Signature
0x9a7f…e21b
Verify
eip191 ✓
Certificate
SHA-256 leaf
The anchor
Merkle root
0x41f8…6d20
Polygon
block 71,204,883
Bitcoin
block 958,544 · OTS
Anchored
proof fixed in time

What it proves — and what it does not

This is part of the product, not the fine print. We are precise about the claim.

Proved, trustlessly

  • This address produced this signature over this challenge.
  • The signer held the private key at the time of signing.
  • The certificate hash existed at the on-chain anchor time.

Not proved

  • The identity of the signer.
  • That control is exclusive, or that the key was not shared or coerced.
  • That the signer is your customer — identity binding is your KYC.

The full statement, the per-chain cryptography and how to verify it yourself are on the proof semantics page.

Why this exists

Several regimes require verifying control of a self-hosted wallet by technical means — not a screenshot.

FATF Recommendation 16

The “travel rule” expects obliged entities to verify control of self-hosted wallets by technical means.

EU Transfer of Funds

Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 requires verifying that a self-hosted wallet is controlled by the customer.

MiCA

Self-hosted-wallet checks under MiCA need a repeatable, evidenced method — not a screenshot.

API and webhooks

Run verifications from your own onboarding or withdrawal flow, without opening the dashboard.

Included in the Pro and Business plans.
  • One call creates a request and returns the signing link to send to your counterparty.
  • Webhooks tell your system when the counterparty signs and when the certificate is anchored, so nothing has to poll.
  • Every webhook is signed with HMAC-SHA256. Certificates come back as a JSON proof packet or a PDF.
API documentationSee plans
Create a request
curl https://basignet.com/api/v1/requests \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SIGNET_KEY" \
  -d '{"chain":"tron","reference":"KYC-0412","anchor":true}'

→ { "status": "pending",
    "signingUrl": "https://basignet.com/s/q0tHA2…" }
Webhook your server receives
POST /webhooks/signet
Signet-Signature: t=1759312345,v1=5f2c…

{ "type": "request.verified",
  "data": { "request": { "status": "verified",
    "certificate": { "address": "TNeiUD…", "sigType": "tronv2" } } } }

Works with any wallet

Message signing on every major chain. Hardware and offline signing via paste — no wallet integration required.

Ethereum
EIP-191 · 1271
Polygon
EIP-191 · 1271
Base
EIP-191 · 1271
Arbitrum One
EIP-191 · 1271
Optimism
EIP-191 · 1271
BNB Chain
EIP-191 · 1271
Avalanche
EIP-191 · 1271
Gnosis
EIP-191 · 1271
Linea
EIP-191 · 1271
Scroll
EIP-191 · 1271
zkSync Era
EIP-191 · 1271
Polygon zkEVM
EIP-191 · 1271
Celo
EIP-191 · 1271
Bitcoin
BIP-137 · 322
Litecoin
BIP-137
Dogecoin
BIP-137
Zcash (transparent)
BIP-137
Solana
ed25519
Polkadot
sr25519 · ed25519
Kusama
sr25519 · ed25519
TRON
signMessageV2

EIP-191 signatures verify on any EVM network out of the box — this is a curated set, not a limit.